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Forsythe: The Tradition of Interpretavism In Constitutional Interpretation

BOOK REVIEW
THE TRADITION OF INTERPRETAVISM IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
CLARKE

D.

FORSYTHE*

The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From ConstitutionalInterpretation
to Judge-Made Law, by Christopher Wolfe. New York, N.Y.: Basic Books,
Inc., 1986. Pp. 356.
In 1977, Raoul Berger published Government by Judiciary,' an extended analysis of the Supreme Court's modern approach to judicial review
and, in particular, its interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. It was

Berger's thesis that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses had been
interpreted by the Supreme Court in disregard of the original legislative
intent of the fourteenth amendment and that the modern Supreme Court,
in general, had formulated a mode of judicial review that was guided not by
any faithful interpretation of the Framers' intent but by the Justices' notions of good public policy.2 Berger's thesis had considerable force, as evidenced by the strong and widespread reaction it sparked in many judges
and academics3 and by the concessions it evoked from commentators and
* Allegheny College (B.A., 1980); Valparaiso University (J.D., 1983).
1. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION

OF THE FOUR-

TEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).

2. See generally R. BERGER, supra note I, at 3. See also R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE (1982).

3. See, e.g., McAfee, Berger v. The Supreme Court - The Implications of His Exceptions-Clause Odyssey, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 219 (1984); Dimond, Strict Construction and
Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination under the Equal ProtectionClause: Meeting Raoul
Berger On Interpretavist Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1982); Soifer, Protecting Civil
Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979); Symposium, 6
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403-635 (1979); Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEX. L. REv. 579
(1978); Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the
"Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603
(1978); Lynch, Book Review, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1091 (1978); Murphy, Book Review, 87
YALE L.J. 1752 (1978); Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 117 (1978); Perry, Book Review, 78 COL. L. REV. 685 (1978); Kay, Book Review, 10
CONN. L. REV. 801 (1978); Kommers, Book Review, 40 REV. OF POL. 409 (1978); Cover,
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critics that Berger had proved his case.4
Almost by itself, Government by Judiciary spawned an ongoing reexamination of the function and legitimacy of the Supreme Court's modern
approach to judicial review. 5 The two primary conceptions of judicial review that have occupied the field in this debate were labeled "interpretavism" and "noninterpretavism" by Dean John Hart Ely.' Interpretavism
posits that constitutional interpretation, in order to have political and moral
legitimacy in a democratic republic with a written constitution founded on
majority rule and the rule of law, must take as its guidepost the faithful
application of the original legislative intent of the Constitution or its
amendments, because the constitutional provisions are established by the
representatives of, and ratified by, the people. 7 Noninterpretavism, on the
other hand, maintains that the original purpose (intent) of constitutional
provisions is not binding on the Supreme Court and that the Justices may
adopt a number of different approaches to constitutional interpretation, as
long as that interpretation advances certain notions of moral philosophy for example, equality, democracy, liberty, human dignity, minority rights,
or political representation. If this description of noninterpretavism seems
vague, it is because noninterpretavism is identifiable more by its rejection of
the original intent of the Constitution as a binding rule of law than by any
quantifiable content. While noninterpretavists agree in rejecting interpretavism, they widely disagree among themselves as to the proper, alternative
approach to constitutional interpretation.'
Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26; Pangle, Book Review, 50 PUB. INT. 157
(1978).
4. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rule Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretavism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 800 (1983); Perry, Interpretavism. Freedom of
Expression & Equal Protection,42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 285 n.100 (1981); Alexander, Modern
Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy & C/itique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 4
(1981); Gangi, Judicial Expansionism: An Evaluation of the Ongoing Debate, 8 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 1 (1981); Bridwell, The Scope of Judicial Review: A Dirge for the Theories of Majority
Rule?, 31 S.C.L. REV. 617 (1980); Perry, Book Review, 78 COL. L. REv. 685, 694 (1978);
Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REV. 579, 581 (1978).
5. It may be impossible to attribute the initiation of the ongoing debate entirely to
Berger, but one measure of his impact may be seen in the Symposium devoted by the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly to Berger's GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY. See Symposium, 6
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403 (1979). See also Gangi, supra note 4, at 1.
6. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1980);
Bork, The Struggle Over the Role of Court, NATIONAL REVIEW, Sept. 17, 1982, at 1137.
Thomas Grey, however, thinks that he may have first penned the labels. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. I, 1 n.1 (1984).
7. See J. ELY, supra note 6, at 1.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Bork, Styles in ConstitutionalTheory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 386-87 (1985)
("The groves of legal academe are thick with young philosophers who propose various systems
of morality that judges must use to create new constitutional rights."); Brest, Who Decides?,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661 (1985); McArthur, Abandoning the Constitution: The New Wave in
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The noninterpretavists have formulated many attacks against interpretavism. For example, noninterpretavists deny that the Framers' intent is
discernable.' 0 They deny that the Framers themselves envisioned a constitutional interpretation that adheres to the original legislative intent.'" Some

assert that the Framers formulated constitutional provisions in an "open
ended" manner, in order for future judges to apply the Constitution according to evolving principles of morality or political philosophy.' 2 Others assert

that interpretavism requires judges to be amoral or nihilistic." Some contend that interpretavism would foster a rigid, sterile Constitution that becomes obsolete and unresponsive to change in society. 4
Although interpretavists, including Berger, have demonstrated with

considerable support, that individual Supreme Court decisions contravene
the Framers' intent,' 5 until recently none has endeavored to comprehenConstitutional Theory, 59 TUL. L. REV. 280, 305 (1984); Davis, Judicial Review and the
Constitution - The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 443 (1983); Maltz, Murder in
the Cathedral - The Supreme Court as Moral Prophet, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 623 (1983);
Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065, 1067, 1089 (1981).
10. See, e.g., Address by Justice William Brennan, Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985).
II. See, e.g., Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885 (1985).
12. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 6, at 19.
13. See, e.g., S. MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT v. THE CONSTITUTION (1986); Barber, The
New Right Assault on Moral Inquiry in Constitutional Law, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253
(1986). The exact opposite - that noninterpretavism leads to constitutional nihilism - seems
to be true, however. See Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEx. L.J. 383, 387
(1985).
14. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 10; Peebles, A Call to High Debate: The Organic
Constitution in Its Formative Era, 1890-1920, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 49 (1980).
15. See generally Berger, Some Reflections on Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
I (1986); Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296
(1986); Berger, McAfee v. Berger: A Youthful Debunker's Rampage, 22 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
1 (1986); Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation" The Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. I (1986); Berger, G. Edward White's Apology for Judicial Activism,
63 TEX. L. REV. 367 (1984); Berger, Lawyering v. Philosophizing: Facts or Fancies, 9 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 171 (1984); Berger, Death Penalties and Hugo Bedau: A Crusading Philosopher Goes Overboard, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 863 (1984); Berger, Mark Tushnet's Critique of
Interpretavism, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 532 (1983); Berger, A Study of Youthful Omniscience: Gerald Lynch on Judicial Review, 36 ARK. L. REV. 215 (1982); Berger, Ely's "Theory
of Judicial Review," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87 (1981); Berger, Paul Brest's Brief for an Imperial
Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. I (1981); Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981); Berger, Soifer to the
Rescue of History, 32 S.C.L. REV. 427 (1981); Berger, "Government By Judiciary". Judge
Gibbons' Argument Ad Hominem, 59 B.U.L. REV. 783 (1979); Berger, Government By Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277 (1979); Berger, The Scope of Judicial
Review: An Ongoing Debate, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527 (1979); Berger, The Scope of
Judicial Review and Walter Murphy, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 341 (1979); Berger, Government By
Judiciary: Some Countercriticism, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1125 (1978).
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sively define interpretavism itself, explain its historical validity, its mode of
reasoning, or its application to the Constitution. Although it is possible to
glean a body of interpretavist principles by studying Supreme Court opinions from the 1790 to the 1986 Term, 6 it is necessary to go back 150 years
to Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution7 in order to find a
comprehensive treatise on an interpretavist application of the
Constitution.' 8
The gap has been partially filled by Christopher Wolfe, Associate Professor of Political Science at Marquette University, in his recent book, The
Rise of Modern JudicialReview.'" Wolfe sets out to describe what he sees
as "the transformation of constitutional interpretation and judicial power in
America, ' 2 0 and he intentionally confines his book to a description, rather
than an explicit approval or disapproval, of that transformation. His stated
purpose is to establish "a better framework" for the continuing debate
about the nature and scope for judicial review. Wolfe endeavors to "make
the Founders' views .. . better understood, so that they can be taken
seriously." 2' 1
The Rise of Modern Judicial Review begins with an indepth description of the traditional principles and practice of judicial review, as evidenced in the legal culture of the Founding Era, The Federalist, and the
opinions of the Marshall and Taney Courts. Wolfe calls this period, from
1789-1890, the "Traditional Era." The second part is an analysis of the
period in Supreme Court history from the late 19th century to the "constitutional revolution" of 1937, a period which saw the rise of substantive due
process, which was primarily limited to economic cases. Here, Wolfe concentrates on the development of constitutional doctrine in due process, commerce, and freedom of speech. Wolfe calls this the "Transitional Era." The
third part focuses on the modern use of substantive due process that arose
in the Transitional Era. Substantive due process, in conjunction with chang16. See, e.g., Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720, 730 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 107 S. Ct. 544, 557 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 678 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Hostetter v. Idelwild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 338 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 239 (1796).
17. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 400,
at 295 (1873 ed.).
18. But see J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1971).
Berger has more recently attempted to explain interpretavism itself, its origins and principles.
See R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FRAMERS' DESIGN (1987) (Appendix); Berger, Some Reflections on Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I (1986); Berger, "Original Intention" in
Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296 (1986).
19. C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW (1986).
20. Id. at ix.
21. Id. at ix-x.
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ing notions of the Constitution and the judicial function, established the
basis for a fundamental revision in the theory and practice of judicial review. Wolfe calls this the "Modern Era." Finally, Wolfe concludes by summarizing the three eras he describes and by briefly analyzing alternative
noninterpretavist theories of judicial review recently formulated by John
Hart Ely,2" Ronald Dworkin,' 3 and Jesse Choper.2 4 In all, Wolfe analyzes
these eras in Supreme Court history - the decisions and doctrines - with
considerable skill, understanding, and wisdom.
Surely one of the great merits of The Rise of Modern Judicial Review
is the first section on the Traditional Era in constitutional interpretation. As
Wolfe says, "the first step in recognizing the radical character of modern
judicial review is to recognize that there once was a very different form of
judicial review in the United States. ' 25 This section, which describes the
mode of constitutional interpretation inherited from the Founding Era and
followed by the early Supreme Court, is unprecedented in the legal literature and is well worth the publication of the book alone.
Wolfe explains that the founding generation and the early Supreme
Court applied familiar rules of legal interpretation, inherited from the English legal tradition, to the new, federal constitution. The basic rule of construction of written instruments in the Founding Era was that the interpreter must seek to discern and apply the intent of the framers, drafters, or
author of the document. Wolfe shows that the task of discerning and applying the intent of the document is undertaken through a set of complex rules
of construction that have evolved over the course of the common law. The
basic rule is that the plain language used by the authors in the document is
the most authoritative guide to the authors' intention and thus controls the
meaning of the document, absent a defect in the language. If the plain language is defective (e.g., ambiguous), the interpreter may consult various
intrinsic aids, which include the context or subject matter, or extrinsic aids,
which include the purpose for which the provision was adopted, the legislative history, or contemporaneous expositions on the meaning. Actually, legislative history may be seen as merely one type of contemporaneous exposition. The importance of each rule of interpretation is ranked by the degree
of authority that may be assigned to each type of evidence of the legislative
intent. Thus, the first rule of construction is to consult the plain language
because it is primarily through the use of certain language that legislators,
framers, and ratifiers convey their purpose in creating the law, and in fact,
the language is generally the most reliable evidence. Likewise, intrinsic evi22.
23.
24.

J. ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980).
C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 14.

TIONAL RECONSIDERATION

25.
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dence is more reliable than extrinsic evidence.
Wolfe explains that the application of the rules of interpretation had
6"a common purpose agreed upon by all, namely, ascertaining the will of the
legislator." 6 The application of the rules "should be done with a view to
the evident intent of those who framed it.""7 All the rules of interpretation,
in effect, reflect different evidence of legislative intent. Since the legislative
body drafts and enacts the law, that intention may be referred to as the
intention "of the Legislature," "of the legislators," or "of the Framers."
The early Supreme Court repeatedly referred to the intent of "the Framers" or "of the Convention."2 In all cases, however, the task is to discern
the legislative purpose of the law, because the legislature represents the
people in the lawmaking branch of government. Likewise, the delegates represented the people in the Constitutional Convention and in the state ratifying conventions. The rules of interpretation are only the means to that end.
In other words,.the end of interpretation is to discern and apply the intention of the law, and the rules of interpretation are the time-honored means
to that end.
If Wolfe's analysis of the colonial and English heritage is abbreviated,
as one review has contended, 9 it is nevertheless accurate. Wolfe primarily
relies upon Blackstone for his description of legal interpretation at common
law. But his argument that the purpose of interpretation was to discern and
apply the intent of the makers of the law, and that this was achieved
through the application of a hierarchy of rules, is supported by a large body
30
of scholarship.
In any case, as Professor Wolfe convincingly demonstrates, these rules
of interpretation were followed by Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson in
their debate on the constitutionality of the National Bank in the 1790s. 1' In
arguing against the Bank, Madison contended that, in interpreting the Constitution, "in controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the instrument, if it be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper guide. Contem26. Id. at 17-18.
27. Id. at 24.
28. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838); Barron
v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
122, 203 (1819); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 239 (1796).
29. See Powell, Book Review, 65 TEX. L. REV. 859 (1987).

30. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 1,at 363-72; R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987) (Appendix); I J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 128 (1971); Berger, Some Reflec-

tions on Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I (1986); Berger, "Original Intention" in
Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296 (1986); Corwin, The "Higher Law"
Background of American Constitutional Law (pts. I & 2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928), 42
HARV.

L. REV. 365 (1928).

31. C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 25-37.
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porary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evidence of the meaning
of parties." 2 Madison held that, in controverted cases, resort could be had
to the debates of the federal convention and to "the statements of those who

defended the Constitution in public debate and in the state ratifying con-

ventions.""8 Madison concluded that the bank was unconstitutional, as evidenced "by expositions of friends of the Constitution while depending
before the public . . . by the apparent intention of the parties which ratified
the instrument."8" As an example of extrinsic aids, Madison cited the Journal of the Convention in the debate over the Bank. Hamilton cited the Journal in the debate over the Jay Treaty. Jefferson, in arguing against the
Bank, looked to the ordinary meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause

and narrowly interpreted "necessary." Jefferson contended that a narrow
interpretation was intended by the Constitution. Hamilton argued in favor
of the Bank. He also looked to the ordinary meaning of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, but argued that a broad interpretation of "necessary" was
"the intent of the Convention." Hamilton accepted the rule of construction
that the intent of the parties to the Constitution is the proper guide, but
contended that "that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself,
according to the usual and established rules of construction." 3 5 In other
words, discerning and applying the intention of the parties or framers is the
end, and the rules of construction are the means to that end. Each of these
Founders agreed upon the rules of interpretation, although in their debate
they emphasized different rules and reached different results. But each
based his interpretation upon a common body of principles of
interpretation.
To the facile objection that the debate between Madison, Hamilton,
and Jefferson proves the ambiguity of the Constitution and the worthlessness of interpretavist rules, Wolfe responds that, given the diversity in
human nature and intellect, there will obviously be differences in interpretation; the rules of construction do not resolve all problems of interpretation.
Interpretavists have never contented that rules of interpretation are a panacea or that they invariably lead to one clear, absolute interpretation.
Wolfe acknowledges that "[i]nterpretation is obviously not a mechanical
process." 36 Still, as Wolfe writes, rules nevertheless "narrow the range of
'3 7
differences greatly and provide a common standard for deciding issues."
They confine judicial power within certain limits and enforce a common
starting point for individual interpretation. They thus promote stability in
the law and preserve the rule of law. Most importantly, by guiding judges
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.

Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 37.
Id.
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to effectively apply the legislative intent, the rules preserve democratic rule
by the application of the will of the people through their representatives.
One of the most important parts of Wolfe's book is his thorough and
perceptive analysis of the rules of constitutional interpretation followed by
the Marshall and Taney Courts. Wolfe convincingly shows that the early
Supreme Court consistently applied the rules of statutory construction, inherited from English legal culture, to the interpretation of the Constitution.
Wolfe seeks the answer to what may seem a simple question: what was the
mode of constitutional interpretation utilized by the early Supreme Court
and Chief Justice Marshall? The strength of Wolfe's analysis is based on
his premise that the way to learn constitutional interpretation is to analyze
in depth the decisions and process of interpretation of the Marshall and
Taney Court. The body of rules established in the common law, adopted by
the Founders, and followed by Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison, were employed by the early Supreme Court.
Wolfe points out the fallacy of those who would make of Marshall a
noninterpretavist by this statement, in McCulloch v. Maryland,8 that "we
must never forget, that it is a constitution that we are expounding." 9 As
Wolfe shows, this statement is taken completely out of context if used to
support a broad power in the Supreme Court to alter the Constitution's
principles beyond the original legislative intent. Rather, the context of Marshall's statement is the interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause
- whether the word "necessary" means "absolutely necessary" or, more
broadly, "appropriate." In his discussion of Congress' power, Marshall reasoned that the Constitution was only intended to set forth a basic set of
principles afid that Congress' powers could not be listed in detail. But Congress must have "discretion to choose appropriate means to give effect to
the powers granted by the Constitution."' 0 By stating that "it is a constitution that we are expounding," therefore, Marshall meant to emphasize that
the Necessary and Proper Clause must be interpreted broadly to allow Congress to effectuate the powers granted to Congress, since the Constitution
could not set forth Congress' powers in detail. There is a fundamental difference between the Constitution's "intrinsic adaptability" by the legislative
branch and its "extrinsic adaptation" by the judicial branch."'
Marshall followed the rules of construction by looking first to the
38. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
39. Id. at 407; C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 215. It is even more incredible that this now
"standard" interpretation should be foisted upon Marshall's words when Marshall himself rejected such an interpretation of McCulloch. See JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH
V. MARYLAND 91-105, 184-85 (G. Gunther ed. 1969).
40. C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 41.

41.

Id. at 215.
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words themselves, the plain language. In Brown v. Maryland,"' Marshall
wrote that, in interpreting the Constitution, "it is proper to take a view of
the literal meaning of the words to be expounded, of their connection with
other words, and of the general objects [purpose, intention] to be accomplished by the prohibitory clause, or by the grant of power. ' ' 43 In Ogden v.
Saunders, Marshall wrote:
To say that the intention of the constitution must prevail; that
this intention must be collected from its words; that its words
are to be understood in that sense in which they are generally
used by those for whom the instrument was intended; that its
provisions are neither to be restricted into insignificance, nor extended to objects not comprehended in them, nor contemplated
by its framers; is to repeat what has been
already said more at
44
large, and is all that can be necessary.
To ascertain the meaning of words (like "commerce" or "necessary"), Marshall looked to the practice of the American government, prior congressional acts, approved authors, the common usage of the words, and their
usage in other places in the Constitution. Likewise, in Sturges v. Crowninshield,4 5 Marshall relied upon the basic principle that the plain langauge
controls when the words are clear:
It would be dangerous in the extreme to infer from extrinsic circumstances, that a case for which the words of an instrument
expressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation . . . if in
any case the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by
any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded,
because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and
injustice of applying the provision to the case would be so monstrous that all mankind would without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.4"
Marshall recognized, however, that words could be ambiguous or defective, due to the "imperfection of human language." 4" In Dartmouth College v. Woodward," Marshall held that a case falling within the plain language of the Constitution must be controlled by that language "unless there
42.
43.
44.

25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 42 (citing Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 437).
Id. at 42 (citing Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827)).

45.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819).

46. C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 47 (citing Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 202).
47. C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 43 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I,
189 (1824)).
48. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 645 (1819).
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be something in the literal construction so obviously absurd, or mischievous,
or repugnant to the general spirit of the instrument, as to justify those who
expound the constitution in making it an exception."'49 Interpretation should
then be guided by intrinsic aids, including those "objects for which [a
power] was given." 6 In construing a word, Marshall said in McCulloch,
"the subject, the context, [and] the intention of the person using [the
words], are all to be taken into view." 5' 1 Marshall looked to the immediate
context of the phrase. A phrase can be construed within the context of an
article of the Constitution or within the context of the Constitution as a
whole. Among the intrinsic sources to which Marshall looked was "the intention of the convention, as manifested in the whole clause. '5 2 Marshall
appealed to intrinsic sources in giving the Necessary and Proper Clause,
following Hamilton, a broad reading. He emphasized that the clause was
included in the powers granted to the Government and not in the restrictions or limits placed on the Government. Moreover, the clause itself is a
grant, not a restriction, of power.
Marshall resorted to extrinsic aids when the words were not clear, as
in Sturges:

[W]here words conflict with each other, where the different
clauses of an instrument bear upon each other, and would be
inconsistent unless the natural and common import of words be
varied, construction becomes necessary, and a5 3departure from
the obvious meaning of the words is justifiable.
Among the extrinsic sources that Marshall referred to was the history of
the times in which the Constitution was formed. 5' For example, in confining
the Bill of Rights to a restriction on the national government alone in Barron v. Baltimore,5 5 Marshall asserted that at the time of the convention, the
people were concerned with "abuses of power by the national government." 56 Note that Marshall did not inquire into whether the Bill of Rights
"needed" to be applied to the states in 1833, or whether the people in 1833
were concerned about abuses of power from the states. Nor did Marshall
"balance" state interests in being free of restriction by the Bill of Rights
against the interests of the people in subjecting the states to the Bill of
49.
645).
50.
51.

316, 415
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 46 (citing Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at
C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 48 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 188).
C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 44 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
(1819)).
Id. at 48 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 419).
Id. at 47 (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819)).
Id. at 49.
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 49 (citing Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250).
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Rights. In Fletcher v. Peck,5" in construing the Contract Clause, Marshall
contended that:
the framers of the constitution viewed, with some apprehension,
the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment; and that the people of the United States, in adopting that
instrument, have manifested a determination to shield themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and
strong passions to which men are exposed. The restrictions on
the legislative power of the States are obviously founded in this
sentiment.58
Marshall also relied on the extrinsic source of treatises on law and politics
which were followed by the Framers for the principles established in the
Constitution. In Ogden v. Saunders,5 9 Marshall held that "we must suppose
that the framers of our constitution took the same view of the subject [as
these treatises] and the language they used confirms this opinion."6 °
In both cases - where the words are clear and the plain language
controls, and where the words are ambiguous and intrinsic or extrinsic aids
may be resorted to - the intention of the Framers is the end to be sought
and those rules are only a means to that end. The rules of interpretation
seek that end and the use of one rule or another is dictated, depending on
the context, because circumstances indicate that one rule or another is the
more reliable means to that end. In all, Wolfe shows that the Marshall and
Taney Courts consistently took as their fundamental guide to constitutional
interpretation the intention of the Framers.
The balance of Wolfe's book attempts to explain how judicial review in
theory and practice has been fundamentally altered from the interpretavist
judicial review practiced by the Marshall and Taney Courts. Wolfe suggests that the change in the practice of judicial review began in the latter
part of the nineteenth century, that the change was slow, and that its
growth was veiled, being confined primarily to the area of economic substantive due process. Wolfe sees the shift evolving not just in the changing
American philosophy of law but in the social sciences more generally - in
Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government"1 and Constitutional Government in the United States,6" wherein Wilson suggested that "the courts
must 'make' law for their own day. ' 63 The shift is also apparent in J. Allen
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 49 (citing Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138).
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 50 (citing Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 353).
W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (J. Hopkins U. Press ed. 1981).
W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1921).

63.

C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 209.
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Smith's The Spirit of American Government,64 Charles Beard's, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States,66 and in
Vernon Parrington's Main Currents in American Thought.66 These authors
serve to undermine "the profound .. .respect for the founders that was
characteristic of nineteenth century America. ' 67 Wolfe suggests that the

attacks on the substance of the Constitution, and on the Founders, by
Smith, Parrington, and Beard, combined with the new view of judicial interpretation developed by the devotees of legal positivism, legal realism, and
sociological jurisprudence, to undermine traditional, interpretavist review.68
Part Three of Wolfe's book consists of an analysis of what he calls
"The Modern Era" in constitutional interpretation. 9 The modern approach
to constitutional interpretation, according to Wolfe, is characterized by "its
tendency to seek freedom from the Constitution and that intention," and by
.a "[d]issatisfaction with the Constitution - either because its prescriptions
are wrong, or, more often, because they do not go far enough. ' 70 Professor
Wolfe notes that one common theme of the modern approach to judicial
review is a disregard of the specific language of the Constitution in favor of
an abstract generalization of its terms. The words "equal protection of the
laws" in the fourteenth amendment are replaced by a notion of "equality of
opportunity" or merely "equality." Thus, the fourteenth amendment does
not guarantee equal protection but equality of result. Likewise, the Contract Clause does not prohibit "impairing the Obligation of Contracts," but
merely "safeguards credit" or "insures economic stability. '7 1 The plain language is simply disregarded. As Justice Stevens recently noted in his dissent
in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,72 the Qualification Clause
of article I, section 2, no longer means that federal voters "shall have" the
qualifications of state voters, as the plain language provides, but7 3only that
they "may but need not have" the qualifications of state voters.
A related theme of modern judicial review, Wolfe argues, is that con64.

J. SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1911).
65. C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1913). See also A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 29 (1987).

Beard's thesis has been thoroughly and severely criticized in F.McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE:
(1958), and in R. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD

THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION

AND THE CONSTITUTION (1956).
66. V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1927).

67. C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 217.
68. Id. at 222. Wolfe's thesis issupported by evidence presented in Peebles, supra note
14.

69. Id. at 203.
70.

Id. at 205.

71. Id.
at 221.
72. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
73. Id. at 557.
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stitutional provisions are viewed as having no inherent, substantive content.
They are treated as abstractions, or "great generalities," in Cardozo's
words, "a collection of broad and rather vague principles that require judicial specification."" 4 Content is to be given to the provisions by the judiciary.7 As Wolfe says, the modern court believes that the purpose of judicial
review is to "take vague constitutional generalities and give them a specific
content appropriate to the time and circumstances by balancing the different considerations of social welfare involved."7"
A third common theme that characterizes modern judicial review is
the use of a balancing test in many areas of constitutional law, by which
interests of different groups are balanced against each other and an accommodation is reached not by resort to the text or purpose of the constitutional provision, but by the Justices' determination of what is best for
American society. Interpretation is "not so much a matter of finding the
meaning of the text; it is balancing different social interests against each
other and choosing what is best for society.""7 It is not the Constitution
which has balanced social interests by its purposes and principles, but the
judges, according to their notion of good public policy. "The fact that balancing requires a judge to decide questions of degree for which there is
little constitutional guidance was one reason earlier judges had tried to
avoid such questions. 17 The effect of the balancing test is to "expand[] the
scope of judicial policy 79making" and maximize the legislative character of
modern judicial review.
A fourth theme that Wolfe identifies is that constitutional provisions
are treated not as binding grants of or limitations on power but as "presumptions in favor of a policy." 80 All constitutional provisions are viewed as
"essentially matters of degree."'" The result is that, for example, the Contract Clause forbids "impairment of the obligation of contracts," unless the
Court determines that it is good public policy to allow "reasonable" impairments. Or, the first amendment protects free speech, unless the Court finds
good reason to allow restrictions. In this way, all distinctions between the
common law (as judicial decisions in the absence of legislation) and the
Constitution (as a binding rule of legislation) are eliminated. The absence
C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 233.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 226.
Id. An intriguing parallel to Wolfe's argument can be found in R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 29, 53, 73 (1978). There, Judge Bork describes the early years of antitrust law, when judges refused to balance interests because it
"provided no discernible standards for judging."
79. C. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 247.
80. Id. at 229.
81. Id.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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of this distinction, as Wolfe points out, is exemplified in both Holmes' writing and Cardozo's The Nature of the Judicial Process.8"
Fifth, constitutional principles are not applied in their nature to new
particulars as historical circumstances change, in accordance with traditional judicial review. Rather, the principles themselves are changed in
their very nature. This distinction is seen in Home Building & Loan Assoc.
v. Blaisdell." The plain language of the Contract Clause prohibits "impairing the Obligation of Contracts" by the states. In Blaisdell, the Court conceded that the state statute impaired the contract but permitted it as a
"reasonable" impairment. 84 Thus, the clause no longer prohibits impairment of the obligation of contracts, as the plain language provides, but only
"unreasonable" impairments, and it is for the judiciary to decide what is
"unreasonable." Since the clause incorporates no standard of "reasonable,"
that standard is completely divorced from the Constitution, its text or purpose, and left entirely to the discretion of the judiciary.
The Warren Court, Wolfe argues, expanded, extended, and made explicit the Court's legislative approach to judicial review. Here, Wolfe's
analysis becomes abbreviated. He covers several areas of constitutional law
in an effort to show that the Court molded the Constitution in its own image without regard to the designs of the Constitution. But, for the sake of
brevity, he does not attempt to show what an interpretavist alternative
would be. Wolfe provides a brief historical analysis to show that the Constitution's intentions were different from various Warren Court decisions, but
he largely defers to previous studies for support. The result is primarily a
good introduction to the Warren Court's jurisprudence.
Lastly, in light of his analysis of traditional judicial review, Wolfe examines current, noninterpretavist theories of judicial review. Wolfe fairly
describes Ronald Dworkin's analysis of judicial policy-making in Taking
Rights Seriously88 and then critiques it. Wolfe does the same with Jesse
Choper's Judicial Review in the National Political Process" and John
Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust." In each case, Wolfe's analysis is abbreviated, although the points he makes are thoughtful and incisive. In light
of these alternative theories of interpretation, Wolfe concludes by asking
whether a return of the judiciary to a more limited, interpretavist approach
to judicial review is realistic. He suggests that while it is not impossible
(Holmes' expansive notion of judicial review would have been thought im82.
note 19,
83.
84.

B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
at 232, 239.
290 U.S. 398 (1934).
Id. at 438.

85. R.
86.
87.

OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

(1921); C.

WOLFE,

supra

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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possible in 1890, but won out by 1940), it would
reform to come about. Whether such reform can
mately depend on the education of the American
on the kind of judiciary they desire. The recent
Robert Bork provide such a civics lesson.

take a long time for such
be accomplished will ultipeople and their decision
confirmation hearings for

As a book evidently intended for a scholarly audience, The Rise of
Modern Judicial Review is sometimes sparse in its supporting evidence and
documentation. What notes exist are placed inconveniently at the end of the
book, and the reader must constantly flip back and forth from text to notes.
Furthermore, since this is a book intended to contribute to an on-going,
vigorous debate, Wolfe would have been well advised to mount evidence
upon evidence. In addition, while The Rise of Modern Judicial Review is
very readable, some passages are choppy, with underdeveloped ideas. Considering Wolfe's exceptional analysis elsewhere, it is disappointing that
some themes were not further developed. I imagine that Wolfe's publisher
did not think that an 800 page book would sell as well. And finally, some of
Wolfe's points are not entirely convincing. For example, is it necessarily
true that "questions of degree" are always incompatible with interpretavist
review, as Wolfe seems to imply? Might not an "impairment" of the obligation of a contract, for example, sometimes involve a question of degree? At
least one interpretavist, Paul Bator, has suggested that such questions are
not inherently incompatible with interpretavism. 88
These shortcomings, however, are minor in comparison with the substantial merits of The Rise of Modern Judicial Review. Wolfe's analysis is
quite sophisticated and thoughtful. He does not simply reiterate vague
phrases like "adhering to the Framers' intent," but explains in great detail
what that means, how such intent is verified, and how it is applied. Wolfe
describes and defines interpretavist judicial review fully and accurately, and
he does so within the broader context of a thorough understanding of the
political philosophy of the Founding Fathers. He concedes that there are
"hard cases" in which the application of general langauge to specific circumstances may make it difficult to ascertain and apply the Framers' intent. But, at the same time, he explains why and how it is still the duty of
judges to adhere as faithfully as possible to the original purpose of the Constitution. Wolfe's considerable learning in political philosophy adds a special dimension to the book that might well be absent from the same book if
written by a lawyer. Writing with a wisdom gained from the knowledge of
broader principles of political philosophy, Wolfe writes with a deep understanding of and appreciation for the Founder's political culture. He shows
an equal understanding of the theories - the strengths and weaknesses 88. See Address by Paul Bator, Federalist Society Symposium, Northwestern University
(Nov. 15, 1986).
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of modern noninterpretavists. Throughout the book, Wolfe demonstrates a
rich and broad understanding of constitutional doctrine and cases.
In setting out to establish "a better framework" for the ongoing debate
between interpretavism and noninterpretavism, Wolfe combines substantial
historical evidence with learned and sober reasoning to indirectly refute the
many arguments raised by noninterpretavists against interpretavism. In separating and weeding out these arguments, Wolfe isolates the fundamental
issue of the debate - the comparative moral, political, and constitutional
legitimacy of interpretavism and noninterpretavism. In this, Wolfe establishes the only legitimate framework for a debate that will determine the
survival of American constitutionalism and the rule of law.
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